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STRIKING THE BALANCE IN CONTRACT THEORY
Joel Levin*
Banks McDowell**
The past three decades have seen an enormous amount of writing by
Anglo-American scholars about contract theory.' If nothing else, this demonstrates the almost universal perception that there are serious problems
with the received theory of contract, the product of giants like Holmes,
Williston, Cardozo and Corbin, a theory enshrined in the First Restatement of Contracts. This theoretical activity, instead of creating a new
paradigm 2, has produced divergent theoretical approaches with various
bands of scholars striking off in quite different directions, and in the
process leaving most judges and lawyers back at the starting point. Contracts scholarship has largely overlooked the advice of Lon Fuller, who
began his famous article The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages with

the comment that "Nietzsche's observation, that the most common stuis trying to do, retains a discompidity consists in forgetting what one
3
forting relevance to legal science."
What should we be trying to do when we build a contract theory for
the law and for lawyers? Contract law was the product of common law
judges and is still largely a matter of common law jurisprudence. It provides the concepts and methods used by courts in resolving disputes arising from a particular institution - the contract - which is part social, part
legal, part psychological and part economic. If the concepts and methods
produced by current contract theory fail to explain what courts are doing
and provide them with useful tools, the theory underlying the concepts
and methods needs reworking.
Legal theory often founders as the result of what appears to be a sound
dichotomy: that between a description of what the law is and a prescription as to what the law should be. Descriptive analysis of law ranges from
simple (and simple-minded) lists of black letter rules to sophisticated
syntheses of various legal concepts and doctrines made clearer and more
* Principal in the law firm of Nurenberg, Plevin, Heller & McCarthy Co.,
L.P.A., Cleveland, Ohio.
** Professor of Law, Washburn University.
1Nearly all the books and articles cited in this article represent participation
in that discussion. From a wealth of possible citations, we give only three recent
surveys: Jay Feinman, The Significance of Contract Theory, 58 UNIV. OF CINN. L.
REV., 1283 (1990); Proceedings and Papers of the Conference on Contract Law:
From Theory to Practice,1988 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW 1 (1989); Robert

Hillman, The Crisis in Modern Contract Theory, 67 TEx. L. REV. 103 (1988).
2 "Paradigm" is used in the sense developed by Thomas Kuhn, which means
a new way of organizing thought in an intellectual field which changes in substantial, if not revolutionary, ways how professionals in that area operate. See
THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1970).
1 Lon Fuller and William Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages,
46 YALE L. J. 52 (1936).
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precise. What is usually ineligible for inclusion in the descriptive realm
is any suggestion that things could be different, better, clearer, fairer,
more efficient, or more just. That task of inclusion belongs with those
who wish to criticize or reform, who want a better system, or more modestly (and, more commonly, in the rush to correct the minute and ignore
the pervasive), a better rule.
Those who see legal theory as limited to either descriptions or prescriptions have lost their way. They have forgotten the essential normative element of law which mocks any simple claim that there is a legal
science in the same sense as there is (at least arguably) a science of
economics or politics. This is because a complete description cannot be
encompassed by a report of a legal rule's (or set of rules') application, but
must include a statement as to whether the rule is the proper one and is
being properly applied. Such a statement is not prescriptive, pure and
simple, for in stating the correct rule there is no recommendation that
the rule is the best (fairest, most just, most rational) rule, merely that it
is the correct rule here. Take for example the confusion surrounding
whether express as well as implied conditions need only be substantially
rather than explicitly performed.4 Reformulating the rule to break down
the express/implied distinction and instead introducing Cardozo's balancing test presented in Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent5 entails more than
a substitution of black letter rules. It involves the normative suggestion
that the balancing test - including such factors as the materiality of the
condition, the degree of forfeiture to the other party, and the willfulness
of the noncompliance - is the right one for those wishing to understand
how conditions in contracts are treated by courts correctly applying their
own law. Absent, however, are any prescriptive suggestions about the
choice between rules or consideration about the area of conditions generally.
One purpose of a contract theory is to provide a picture which adequately depicts how contract law, properly applied, works. The claim of
such a theory would be that various contract rules could be brought
together in such a way that, if individuals properly applying contract law
had to justify their efforts, they would or could adopt such a theory. The
claim would not be that the theory is the best one possible for contracting
generally, best again in terms of fairness, justice, efficiency, etc. Rather,
taking note of law's normative element, the depiction would include the
claim that such a contract theory would encompass how one imaginative,
knowledgeable, and thorough could construct a general theory of contract
which explains the myriad of specific contract rules.
We have previously presented just such a theory, one with claims to
providing an understanding of the common law.6 This theory, the balance
theory of contracts, purposes that a legally binding contract exists where
See discussion in Friedrich Kessler, Grant Gilmore and Anthony Kronman,
CONTRACTS, CASES AND MATERIALS

985-876 (3d ed. 1986).

129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).

6Joel Levin and Banks McDowell, The Balance Theory of Contracts: Seeking
Justice in Voluntary Transactions,29 MCGILL L. J. 25 (1983).
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an obligation has been voluntarily assumed, is reasonablyfair to the party
againstwhom it is enforced, is consistent with society's contractualexpectations. and gives rise to no administrative difficulties barringenforcement.7 The first two elements of voluntariness and fairness are variables:
voluntariness x fairness = putative contract. As voluntariness decreases,
there must be proportionately more fairness. As voluntariness increases,
the need to examine fairness lessens. However, this is not merely a weighing test, for if there does not exist a sufficient threshold of both voluntariness and fairness, there can be no contract. Once the thresholds are
achieved, then rather than some other test showing either the adequacy
or sufficiency of either element being required, the two are weighed such
that if their product is sufficient, a putative contract exists.
The two elements of society's contract expectations and the absence of
administrative difficulties are constants. Unless these elements are present, there is no contract. Thus, if the contract breached is a dinner invitation and not one society would expect to enforce, or if it is an oral
contract for the purchase of land and one society does not wish to enforce,
then there is no contract regardless of any degree of voluntariness or
fairness.
Perhaps the purposes and claims of the balance theory can be made
clearer when it is set along side or contrasted with the other contract
theories. Basically, three different kinds of contract theory have been
advanced, each in two varieties. These could be described as the
mechanical 8 or formal theory, either in the procedural or equitable version; the forward and the backward positional theory; and the directly
social and consequentially social theory. Like all groupings, these are
somewhat arbitrary and simplified, but such classifications are necessary
to get a grasp on significant similarities and differences.
The mechanical or formal theory of contract is one which suggests that
if a certain standard method is followed, and certain prescribed elements
are found to be present, a contract exists. Thus, if there has been such
identifiable conduct as an offer and an acceptance, legally sufficient consideration, mutuality of obligation, and possibly, depending on the theory's complexity, other indications of an intent to contract, a contract
simply exists. One follows the steps and finds either a contract exists
completely or fails completely. Certainly, some form of this mechanical
theory, at least in its procedural posture, was developed and advocated
by such writers as Samuel Williston 9 and Oliver Wendell Holmes 0 .
Id. at 25-26.

is not used here in a derogatory sense. No theory which owes
its development to Oliver Wendell Holmes and Samuel Williston, and includes
contributions by Arthur Corbin and Benjamin Cardozo, can be regarded as unsophisticated or devoid of ethical content. They did, however, provide a theory
which operated in a mechanical way, listing certain elements which had to be
found in a cumulative fashion to create a cause of action.
1Williston's theory is presented in its most influential form in American Law
Institute, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1932), where he was the
principal reporter. His theory is justified in much more detail in his multi-volume
8 "Mechanical"

treatise,

SAMUEL WILLISTON,

by R. Lord).

A

TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS,

'0 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW,
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A variation of the mechanical theory is one where procedural mechanics
alone may be inadequate to reach a contract. Supplementation may be
required or an occasional dose of equity may override the mechanistic
outcome. Thus, writers and jurists such as Arthur Corbin", Benjamin
Cardozo, Lon Fuller, and Karl Llewellyn suggest that one could reach a
contract by one of two methods: following all the procedural steps, or if
one step is missing, finding some additional or equitable argument to
impose a contractual obligation. The equitable matter which most famously would allow such a mechanical theorist to supplement a missing
term, such as consideration, was that of reliance.
Neither form of mechanical theory in general looked either to the bargaining context or circumstances of the contract or to its basic decency,
let alone justice, voluntariness, or equity. Thus, contracts from indentured
servitude to usury to blackmail might qualify under the theory1 2, while
all sorts of form contracts, ongoing contracts and multi-party contracts
would present grave difficulties, as the mechanics of the theory would
become so complex as to be unhelpful at best and misleading at worse.
Seeing the difficulties of the mechanical theory, positional theorists
have suggested that courts should scrutinize the behavior of the parties
at the time of formation of the contract. What they closely examined is
the responsibility of those contracting when one of the parties significantly changes its position in a way which is meant to create a duty. The
forward positional theory was advanced by Charles Fried when he found
a promise both necessary and sufficient to cause contractual duties to
arise.'3 Not every statement was a promise, and not every promise was
adequate, but basically, the intentionality surrounding the making of a
promise and the moral obligations which arise toward those to whom the
promise is directed were the props which created the contractual backdrop. Patrick Atiyah, advancing a backward positional theory, looked not
so much at the promise made, but rather to representations relied upon,
finding positions which justifiably changed when such assertions were
made. 14 Thus, for Atiyah, contract collapses into tort, and reliance rather
than expectation damages are the sole measure of recovery for contractual
breach.15

11According to Grant Gilmore, during the drafting sessions for the first Restatement, Arthur Corbin criticized the exclusive use of bargained for consideration which Williston had written into the draft as the enforcement criteria for

promises, citing a number of decisions by Cardozo on the New York Court of
Appeals. Because of this, the famous Section 90, providing for promissory estoppel,
was added to the Restatement. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT,
61-65 (1974).
2 This is not to say that the Holmes-Williston theory actually led to entorcing
such contracts, but there was nothing in the theory that precluded such enforcement. Counter-examples like this test the soundness of the theory.
3 CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT As PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION

(1981).

14PATRICK ATrYAH,

THE RISE

AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT

(1979).

15Id.
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The positional theorists have the advantage of understanding that contract is more than magical incantation or the proper following of a mystical mechanism, even a mechanism where enlightened religion has replaced superstition. However, positions asserted and changed address
only a narrow spectrum of the problems presented in contracts. While a
positional theorist might offer some explanation as to why certain contracts should or should not be enforced, no guidance is given as to how
contracts without promises are created, what role expectation interests
should have, what one should do with executory contracts, how to handle
ongoing contracts, what to do when promises or representations are presented imperfectly and how to analyze the myriad of other technical
contract problems from missing terms to damages.
These difficulties have caused other contract theorists to view the attempt of the positionalists to get beyond the mechanistic views of earlier
theorists by casting a wider net as to the scope of data and of concepts
to be used in contract litigation as insufficient. The failure of the positionalists was that the net was not cast even wider. These other theorists
might be labeled as social theorists and again, come in two varieties:
consequential and direct. The social consequential theorists are, in general, those associated with the law and economics movement. 8 Contracts
are, if not a branch of economics, part and parcel of the economic system.
Those factors which motivate economic behavior inform contract analysis.
Thus, utility theory and rational methods of risk allocation become factors
in judging what set ofbehavior is contractual and how it should be treated.
Contracts serve as a vehicle for achieving efficiency as rational wealthmaximizers use contractual exchange in an open market to attain their
7
goals, usually but not necessarily economic goals.'
Others within the social theory grouping disagree that individuals are
solely or even primarily motivated by economic factors, suggesting that
a large range of sociological indicators is necessary. This is the position
of direct social theorists, such as Ian Macneil.18 Macneil claims that the
economic or consequentialist social view is too limited, as contracts are
not mere isolated or discrete events, but part of a larger, social, business,
and interpersonal network.
16The best known proponent of this approach is Richard Posner. See RICHARD
ECONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW, 3rd ed. (1986). An early sampling of the
theory can be found in ANTHONY KRONMAN & RICHARD POSNER, eds., THE EcoPOSNER,

(1979). There are many examples of this approach in
the law reviews, including a substantial portion of the work done in the Journal
of Legal Studies.
17The largest group of theorists over the last two decades have belonged to
the law and economics group, perhaps because it has the closest ties to the domNOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW

inant political ideology of this period, but significantly it is the band which has
moved farthest from the work of ordinary lawyers and judges.

- Macneil's positions are presented in

IAN MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CON(1980), as well as in numerous articles including Ian Macneil, Economic
Analysis of ContractualRelations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for a "Rich Classificatory Apparatus" 75 Nw. UNIV. L. REV. 1018 (1981), and Ian Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wisc. L. REV. at 489-508
(1985).
TRACT
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Any contract theory should draw from the wisdom and strength of these
three types of theory: the mechanical with its certainty in identifying
what conduct is contractual, the positional with its justification for why
party behavior ought to impose an obligation, and the social for which
contract is part of the large cultural backdrop.
That said, none of these theories do an adequate job of culling from the
set of possible contenders or putative contracts which agreements should
be enforced or are being enforced by the courts. The mechanical theory
is both over and under inclusive, arguably leaving in blackmail and
slavery but not on-going supply contracts or contracts with missing terms.
The positional theory inspects behavior, looking to individual conduct
rather than the transaction itself. Often lost is the ability to allow contracts to succeed, to accomplish the larger purposes of the freedom to
change, to manage, and to improve one's affairs. Finally, the social theorists notice the social nature of contract and understand its vitality as
a way for individuals to control their lives. But, in looking to social science
rather than developing a legal method for figuring out which possible
contracts are legally enforceable, generality has caused a loss of analytical
and doctrinal usefulness.
As potentially the most powerful theory, both in its analytic ability and
its descriptive comprehension, the social theory bears closer scrutiny
when measured against the balance theory. This scrutiny has already
begun in Professor Macneil's criticism of both the balance theory and the
type of theoretical enterprise it represents generally. 19 These two criticisms are related, but it is his general criticism that is both primary and
indicative. That general criticism is this: a theory, such as the balance
theory, fails because it is uninformative as to a large number of contractually related facts, facts that while not "discretely" part of the formal
contract, nevertheless "relate" to contractual activity and play an essential role in molding that activity. These relational facts, far from being
peripheral, are essential to any understanding of the basic contractual
concepts.
The concepts of voluntariness, fairness, assumed obligation, contract
expectations, and administrative difficulty employed in the balance theory - are not only discrete concepts, worse, in Macneil's estimate, they
are extremely discrete, too emaciated to do the work necessary to explain
the multi-faceted relational contracting world. Thus, the "balance-theory
does not help us to 'know' relational contract," while "we cannot even
understand a promise outside its relational context.

' 20

Completeness is certainly an unassailable goal. However, a theory and
a description are two different things. The goal of a contract theory, such
as the balance theory, is to provide a solution to questions concerning
what is a valid contract within the common or statutory law. It is not the
purpose of a legal theory to provide a listing of all those characteristics
of the contracting process found in society.
19Ian Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know 1985 Wisc.
at 483-538 (1985).
L. REv.
0

' ld. at 502.
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Macneil's fondness for description is tied to his loyalty to social science.
Macneil's survey article and his works in general are punctuated by
references to economics, micro-economics, sociology, neo-economic
models, and, in general, the terminological trappings of social science.
Law is, for Macneil, only a small part of the greater social scene. Social
science is not only necessary to understanding law, but offers a prospective
by which to judge legal theory. For example, the limited "discrete" exchange described by contract theory is only a small part of the economic
small part of the overall economic
picture: "it is inevitably a relatively
2
activities of any given society." 1
Law is not social science and contract is not economics. In that law is
a behavioral activity, it can be studied by social scientists, but then so
can the activity of chemistry or mathematics. What is interesting, informative and useful about law (or chemistry or mathematics) is not that
people do it, but how well it is done, what purposes the activity serves,
and what ends it achieves.
Those who see law as a mere subset of social science naturally view
ordinary legal description as incomplete. The rules of contract are one
small part of economics, and whether labeled "discrete" or "relational"
are inadequate to describe the variety of reasons that precipitate contract
situations. However, they are not intended to do so and are hardly the
worse for it.
Legal rules are constructed without concern for legal completeness.
They, in general, were not designed to achieve explicitly economic goals
(efficiency, productivity, internalizing externalities, etc.). Rather, fairness
has historically been the consistent purpose. The rules in empirical legal
systems are neither consistent nor universally agreed upon. The balance
theory, in offering a particular picture of the common law of contracts,
makes a normative claim beyond pure description: that one way for common law lawyers and judges to assess the validity of a contract is to use
the balance equation. Economics in contract theory is irrelevant in this
matter.
Macneil criticizes not only the purpose, but the mechanics of the balance
theory. Several of the criticisms are based on a misunderstanding,
whether due to a misreading or to inartful expression.
First, Macneil claims the balance theory "is a promise-centered synthesis.."22 The theory does not employ the term "promise", but Macneil
believes it to be implied by the requirement of an assumed obligation.
This may be a terminological quibble. We have not relied on the term
"promise" because it artificially divides express from implied-in-fact contracts, and because a focus on whether an utterance is a promise, prediction, forecast, bragging, vow, plea, or other expression is not pertinent.
Contractual obligation can be (more or less) sharply separated from tortious obligation by understanding the source of the duty. If an obligation

21Id.
22

at 490.
Id. at 500.
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is imposed by society, regardless of the obligor's intentions, it is a tort
(or criminal law) duty. If the obligor took the obligation upon-himself,
the duty is contractual. If this distinction commits us to a hidden promissory premise, so be it. However, this is neither the ordinary use of the
term, nor the use given in such promise-based theories as that of Charles
23

Fried.

Macneil criticizes the balance theory for not making "assumed obligation" an expressed element for detailed exposition. If promise in the
ordinary sense was a requirement, that would have been a substantial
oversight. Assumed obligation serves several, less grand purposes. It allows a clear distinction between contract and tort, a crucial distinction
when remedies are considered. It serves as a handle or placeholder to
attach voluntariness and fairness. Finally, it names a social act, which
needs to meet a certain minimal description in order to judge whether
the putative contract is valid. In that this last purpose is complicated,
our treatment may have been too hasty. The normal difficulty, though,
in applying assumed obligation is in measuring voluntariness and fairness, not in assessing the minimal intent necessary to begin the contract
and obligation process.24
Second, Macneil suggests the concepts of voluntariness and fairness
are "simply inadequate" to do the work required. He attacks them in
turn. Macneil claims that all decisions are made from pressured positions,
"pressures which 'coerce' people into those arrangements, irrespective of
how they happen to have reached their present circumstances '25 This is
a position that H.L.A. Hart labeled, in another context, that of the "disappointed absolutist. '26 Because individuals rarely have completely free
choices (no pressure, no coercion, no difficulties, just "should I have a hot
fudge sundae or a sacher tort"), Macneil believes no such thing as "voluntariness" exists. However, that perfect choice is unavailable does not
imply that no choice is available. (That dietary considerations motivate
grapefruit rather than sacher tort does not mean there is no choice: a
grapefruit grower's gun to one's head probably does).
The balance theory defines voluntariness in relative terms. "An obligation is voluntary to the degree that it is chosen consciously and willingly by the obligor."27 Contract responsibility (or liability) is made
similar to responsibility in the matter of choice generally: the greater
the consent and the less the duress, the greater the voluntariness and
the more willing society (through its courts) is to impose compliance on
the potential obligor. One consequence of ignoring voluntariness alto-

Fried, supra note 13.

This view is now predominant in the law of sales contracts. See U.C.C. §§
2-204 and 2-207(3).
25 Macneil, supra note 19, at 505.
26

H.L.A.

27

Levin and McDowell, supra note 6, at 28.

HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 135 (1961).
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gether as a fictional impossibility is that the pressures which motivate
a supply contract under difficult circumstances and a supply contract
under monopolistic circumstances are conflated.
Of course, pressure often sparks contract behavior. One borrows money,
seeks new employment, pays a carpenter to fix a leaky roof, or purchases
additional insurance because not all is quite right with the status quo.
Such contracts are ordinarily enforced, and should be under either the
traditional theory or the balance theory. However, not every pressured
contract has been or should be enforced. Where the willingness to become
obligated moves from making the reasonable choices of an ordinary member of the Twentieth Century tumult to a desperate seeking to avoid
unconscionable or coerced alternatives, voluntariness abates. In order for
voluntariness to be viable, the background duress, historically ubiquitous
and now too often prevalent in underdeveloped societies, must be absent.
As distressing as the pressure to keep up payments on a second car and
the newly added family-room may be, such distress does not evoke the
background coercion necessary to affect voluntariness significantly.
Macneil also criticizes the concept of fairness in the balance theory.
Macneil claims fairness as a concept is either so broad that it "offers little
guidance" or so narrow that "relational factors will be omitted."2
The use of fairness in the balance theory is severely circumscribed. A
contract is fair to the extent that it is one (although not necessarily the
one) which the parties might have reached had they sufficient knowledge
to understand all relevant aspects of the transaction and one where the
obligor is not a "bargaining dwarf".
Certainly, any concept to be useful must walk a line between platitudinous overbreadth and precise, but narrow, uselessness. The particular
conception of fairness we employed is not unlike the one courts routinely
use to fill in missing terms of implied contracts.2 9 It is tied to knowledge
rather than directly to justice, and prevents, for example, rash enlistment
contracts: those readily entered into by parties who do not understand
the full implications of the terms, where the implications are ones any
knowledgeable obligor would dearly want to avoid.
Macneil suggests but fails to demonstrate that the concept of fairness
thus used indicates knowledge of relational conditions, and that inclusion
debilitates the concept itself. This suggestion simply misunderstands a
basic premise of the balance theory. Foresight is part of knowledge, as
what might happen to alter the conditions of performance or the scope of
duty can affect the fairness of contract. Macneil's example of a contract
which he believes our definition of "fairness" cannot adequately resolve
is:
2sMacneil,

supra note 19, at 505.
An interesting and perhaps extreme example of this is Aetna Ins. Co. of
Hartford Conn. v. Licking Valley Milling Co., 19 F.2d 177 (6th Cir., 1927), where

the court found an oral contract of insurance and by implication filled in the
missing terms of the duration of the contract, the identity of the insurer, the
amount of the premium, and whether the insured was to be extended credit.
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*.. if the UAW were to challenge collective bargaining agreements made a few years ago on the grounds of "unfairness"
does its knowledge include the more-rapid- than expected recovery of the automobile companies, and the obscene bonuses
managers were to give themselves? If the answer is yes, "fairness" incorporates without identification a good many important relational factors, such as reciprocity, decent handling of
power, and role integrity. If the answer is no, then those important factors are omitted from consideration 0
Although not mentioned, apparently the labor union made major wage
concessions. Later in the life of the contract, management experienced
great profits and gave its managers large (Macneil uses the more emotive
term "obscene") bonuses. Is such a contract rendered unfair?
This, like many of Macneil's questions, is impossible to answer from
what we are told. Complex contracts involve many factors. Labeling a
contract unfair, voluntary, or much of anything else from a one or two
sentence summary is nearly pointless. However, obscene bonuses or not,
this does not appear in any obvious way to be an unfair contract. One
can assume that knowledgeable, experienced negotiators were employed
by the union, and that, in exchange for wage concessions, the union
received something it valued. Moreover, the UAW is hardly known to be
a bargaining dwarf. If it ridiculously allowed a contract predicated on
the historical improbability that an economic recovery was impossible or
that management could be counted on to be altruistic, these alone would
not appear to be reasons to term the deal unfair. Many contracts are
gambles. A life insurance contract is not unfair because the insured lives
too briefly or too long. Using contract law to create a perfect society is
not only foolish and dangerous social engineering: it destroys a useful
social institution and cripples freedom of action.
The most serious test of a contract theory is its ability to resolve the
real problems raised by the wide variety of contract cases. This is just
the test Macneil believes the balance theory fails. He suggest that the
theory is tested only by application to "neo-classical contract cases",3 1 and
that he would "rather doubt" its application to those situations he tags
"relational".

30Macneil, supra note 19, at 505.
11Another criticism Macneil levels against us is that in selecting examples to
demonstrate how our theory works, we chose primarily casebook examples of
discrete contracts, a charge of selectively presenting the evidence in order to put
our theory in the best light. We selected the cases, not because they were either
first year cases or discrete contract situations, but because they belong to the
common core of cases which all American lawyers having studied from standard
casebooks would know without detailed presentation of facts and background.
They form part of the educational heritage of lawyers. It is true that none of them
involved what Macneil and his colleagues would call a relational contract situation.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol40/iss1/4
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Macneil considers the number of discrete contracts to be limited, so
that the value of a theory concerned with such cases is concomitantly
limited. However, neither the classical theory of contract, with its mechanistic apparatus of offer, acceptance, consideration, and mutuality,
nor the many plugs and patches applied to that theory, including such
concepts as "reliance" and "duress", are considered adequate by anyone
to handle discrete contracts. Providing a definitive test to separate putative from valid discrete contracts would appear to be some accomplishment, regardless of how (to Macneil's mind) modest. Certainly, there are
no other thorough-going, general theories which make a claim to providing such a test.
However, it is simply not true that the balance theory has such restricted application. This can be demonstrated by applying the theory to
a contract situation Macneil would clearly label relational: that faced by
32
the court in Laclede Gas Company v. Amoco Oil Company.
Laclede involved a complex requirements transaction where the defendant Amoco agreed to supply plaintiff Laclede with all the propane
gas needed for various residential developments until natural gas lines
were extended to these developments. If the plaintiff needed propane in
any given development, it would so request in a supplemental form letter;
and if defendant decided to supply the propane, it would bind itself to do
so by signing this supplemental form. Consistent with the needs of a longterm supply arrangement, there was a flexible pricing provision - price
was set by reference to "the Wood River Area Posted Price for propane.
.. "Amoco agreed to maintain facilities sufficient to produce and deliver
the propane, while Laclede agreed to maintain all distribution facilities
from the point of delivery.
During the winter of 1972-73, Amoco experienced a shortage of propane
and limited its customers, including Laclede, to no more than 80% of their
previous requirements. Laclede objected and demanded 100% of the developments' needs. Amoco then notified Laclede that its Wood River Area
Posted Price of propane had been increased by three cents per gallon.
Laclede objected to the increase and Amoco's response was to send a letter
terminating the original agreement.
Laclede sued for specific performance, or in the alternative, for damages. The trial court denied relief on the ground that the agreement lacked
mutuality, because it found that Laclede had the right to "arbitrarily
cancel the agreement" without a corresponding right in Amoco.
On appeal, the United State's Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed, holding that mutuality existed because there was an implied
promise by Laclede not to purchase propane elsewhere. It then went on
to determine that Laclede was entitled to specific performance.
This litigation grew out of a situation replete with relational contracting elements: a long term for performance with a flexible time for ter-
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mination, variable quantities to be supplied, a floating price, and
numerous places of delivery. Ongoing adjustments and modifications were
expected. Furthermore, the ultimate breakdown in this scheme of ongoing
relational and reciprocal transactions was caused by the larger relational
system the supplier had with its other customers. Due to circumstances
entirely outside its control, Amoco could not fulfill the contractual expectations of its customers and decided (in what seems to be a defensible
and fair arrangement) to deliver an equal proportion of its limited supply
to all of its customers.
Under Macneil's analysis, the parties should have been willing to make
whatever adjustments were necessary to maintain the relation. That did
not happen and the courts were faced with a problem requiring legal, not
economic, standards for resolution. The fact that a transaction was relational in its creation and its performance does not make it relational
for purposes of litigation.
Laclede presents the problem of whether this type of long-term requirements contract is enforceable. (It also presents the problem of
whether specific performance should be given. In allowing the trial court
broad discretion to determine the remedy, the appellate court did what
modern courts tend to do: it ignored the bright line distinction between
grounds for damages and specific performance, and allowed the trial court
to fashion an appropriate remedy with a formal nod to and working
disregard of an archaic and indefensible, medieval set of remedy rules).
The trial court was tied to traditional contract theory. Because Laclede
(arguably) could choose to buy or not to buy oil, it was not bound. The
obligation on Laclede's part was thus illusory, and the contract lacked
validity because it lacked mutuality of obligation. In rejecting this analysis, the appellate court held that because the Laclede's right to cancel
was not explicitly unrestricted, a duty to buy oil can be inferred, making
for a valid contract. The reviewing court rejected the traditional analysis,
could name no new theory it wanted to endorse but, essentially, adopted
a balance theory approach. That is, the Court of Appeals neither followed
the old line nor threw up its hands at being unable to name a new.
The reason the court would find the balance theory congenial is that
it asks the same question the court asked: did the putative obligor undertake an obligation which was voluntary and fair? Incorrect theory can
lead to asking the wrong question. Traditionalists would inquire whether
the writing guarantees mutuality of obligation; promise theorists would
inquire whether Amoco promised (for good consideration) to supply the
oil; Macneil would ask if all the proper relational factors were assembled
and considered. Laclede presents a case where properly applied traditional
or promise theory would not find a valid contract, while it is unclear what
theory Macneil would apply or what result he would reach after he had
succeeded in identifying all the relational complications.
In Laclede, the requirements for validity under the balance theory are
clearly met. Amoco voluntarily undertook an obligation. The obligation
was fair as to it and was one whose consequences could hardly have come
as a complete surprise. This is not an agreement which is outside the
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normal expectations of society or one the courts would be loath to enforce.
A requirements contract is a sensible risk for a corporation handling
many buyers and many supply sources throughout the world.
The Court of Appeals found that there were implied restrictions on the
cancellation clause of the obligee and an implied duty on its part to buy.
Why did it bother to draw those implications, to find a contract where
the facts fell sufficiently short of a traditional contract to justify a finding
of no contract? That is, why did the court look for ways to enforce, rather
than defeat, the obligation allegedly breached?
The answer is embodied in the values made explicit as elements in the
balance theory. Individual choice of action is a basic political, ethical and
economic value highly prized within the common law. Unlike tort duties,
individuals choose to be obligated in the contract area, placing themselves
under a potential obligation or risk because of possible gains or benefits.
In so doing, they express their preferences, earn their incomes, buy property, invest, insure, build, educate, publish, heal, counsel, and generally
exercise their freedom. Courts have traditionally been loath to restrict
these choices when they are voluntary and show the fairness of intelligent
decision-making.
What Macneil would label as "non-discrete" factors are largely irrelevant to the creation of the legal duty. A propane requirements contract
between a local utility and a national oil company can be, not surprisingly,
related to the vicissitudes of the national propane market. Further, the
contract required several years to perform, called for flexible pricing, and
involved a network of other parties. However, neither party in Laclede
had the contracting naivet6 of an eight-year-old trading a baseball bat
for his friend's bicycle horn; nor should we suddenly abandon any hope
of solving contract problems within our legal system because Laclede (and
other cases like it) does not resemble the dealings of eight-year-olds.
Amoco made a contract it later regretted. Many factors led to this
regret, but calling them relational, rather than discrete, changes little
about the fairness of the contract and should change nothing about its
enforceability. An unexpected, avuncular gift of a bicycle horn to the
eight-year-old would lead to that child's dismay over trading his baseball
bat. It is the strength of the balance theory that it can analyze such
disparate contracts under a single structure. In a legal system premised
on fairness, one wonders why disappointments due to the falling propane
market and the unaccountable vagaries of uncles justify different treatment.
A second kind of contracting situation which Macneil believes beyond
the resources of the balance theory is that raised by the termination of
employees at will. In fact, Macneil is struck by "the incredibly difficult
economic and social issues relating to the employment-at-will now being
raised regularly in court (and above all in personnel offices and the
like.)" 33 While not underestimating the social turmoil inherent in the
apparent wane of the employment-at-will situation, the contract problems, at least under the balance theory, are not peculiarly difficult.
" See Macneil, supra note 19, at 507.
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The apparent difficulty in employment contracts is imposed by traditional promise-centered contract analysis. Typically, there is no discussion, let alone a promise, concerning duration, nor is it unexpected that
rational contracting parties would fail to make specific commitments.
Perhaps, employers not knowing future economic conditions would not
incorporate a permanent obligation,34 while employees of any skill or selfconfidence might not want to contract themselves into permanent servitude. More likely, the parties simply failed to agree on or to include a
duration clause. Absent such a clause, the arrangement appears, under
traditional contractual analysis, scarcely binding. Without a promise for
permanent employment being implied, there is no obligation on either
side beyond compensating for past performance and perhaps for giving
some reasonable notice of termination. This then has led to the neat black
letter law formulation that a contract lacking a specified duration is
terminable at the will of either party with or without cause.3 5
The obvious problem with this rule is that it leaves the employment
contract, one of the most important contractual relationships in our society, with little obligatory content. Moreover, this rule neither reflects
the way most employees and many employers view their relationship nor
the way such a relationship has been recently treated by courts. If a
primary purpose of Article 2 of the U.C.C. was to bring the contract law
of sales closer to the expectations of the business community, then there
should be, and in fact has been, a realization that such a reworking is
also necessary in the law of employment contracts. Of course, much of
that realization has been (in terms of the common law) disguised. It has
widely occurred within the context of federal and state statutes governing
labor relations agreements.
Disputes concerning employment-at-will come in two stages: is the
contract one at will, and if not, was there an allowable reason under the
contract (usually categorized as just cause) to terminate the employee?
Under the balance theory, there is certainly the requisite assumed obligation to commit each party to the employment contract. This assumption allows employment generally. The question here, as with most
contracts, is the extent, not the existence, of the obligation. Looking to
promises made or missed, or agreed grounds for discharge, is futile. Instead, two matters are crucial: whether, under the entire circumstances
of contractual performance, it is fair to saddle the obligor (inevitably the
employer) with the requirement to discharge for just cause only, and
whether it is fair to discharge the obligee/employee.
Macneil lists a number of specific, relational cases supposedly beyond
the explanatory ken of the balance theory.3 6 The list is instructive. It
includes a variety of employment contracts governed by civil rights, pen- This factor is so strong that courts have construed "permanent" employment
to be terminable at will. See, American Standard, Inc. v. Jessee, 258 S.E.2d 240
(Ga. App. 1979); Mau v. Omaha Nat. Bank, 299 N.W.2d 308 (Neb. 1980); Hudson

v. Zenith Engraving Co., Inc., 259 S.E.2d 812 (S.C. 1979).
15For authorities supporting this common law rule and the recent exceptions
which have been grafted onto it, see the Annotation at 12 A.L.R. 4th at 544 (1980).
36 See Macneil, supra note 19, at 506-507.
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sion, bankruptcy and labor relations statutes. These statutes are all constraints on parties' contracting freedom and contracting power. In that
they impose duties aside from any assumption of a duty, they are akin
to tort obligations, which, because of the judgments of Congress or state
legislatures, are involuntarily imposed. It is no criticism of the balance
(or any other) theory that it does not account for such statutorily imposed
duties: it is to correct the common law, which the theories explain, that
the statutes are passed. However, one merit of the balance theory is that
many of the worst contractual abuses, remedied by statute only incompletely and in an ad hoc manner, are minimized or eliminated by the
theory's application. For example, contracts involving slavery and indentured servitude, once valid and now restricted by constitutional and
statutory enactments, are generally invalid under the voluntariness requirement of the balance theory. This mirroring or anticipating of statutory reform also occurs with regard to usury, blackmail, monopoly,
juvenile, missing terms, and adhesion contracts. Where, though, there is
a contract situation, for example, which involves reorganization through
the bankruptcy courts, then contract analysis, after a point, simply runs
out. To extend the contractual concepts is not just to stretch its merits,
it is to break it.
The balance theory of contract and the relational approach are very
different projects with different goals. The goal of the relational approach
is to understand the transaction in all its ramifications. This tends to be
a social scientific enterprise. The goal of the balance theory is to explain
how the legal system, most particularly the courts, should resolve contract
disputes. It is designed to answer the general questions lawyers pose to
courts: is a contract valid, should it be enforced and what remedy is
appropriate?
That is, rather than searching for invariably absent promises or indications of intent concerning unanticipated difficulties, courts have recently begun focusing on performance behavior. Juries are being asked
not to search for a promise of ongoing employment, but to judge whether,
under the circumstances of the employment contract, it is fair to discharge
an employee. While society once may have had expectations that employment was terminable at will, that view has at least dampened. Fairness can be seen always to have been the determining test: what is
considered fair simply changes.
Good theory tells which putative contracts are valid. It does not prescribe what an adherent of any particular economic or social school would
suggest is a better way of running the entire contracting process, either
economically or legally. This involves a different kind of theory, prescriptive and reformative. Again, the mere reporting of legal rules or legal
situations is insufficient to constitute a theory. Rules are inconsistent,
courts differ, doctrinal gaps exist, contract law blends with other legal
areas. A contract theory can be judged successful only if it offers a method
(or tests an analogue) for determining which rules or decisions are correct,
not reasons which should be taken to be correct. This is the aim of the
balance theory. Because common law courts tie cases together by the
concept of fairness, the theory is also labeled as one seeking justice in
voluntary obligations.
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